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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction o\ er this matter pursuant to legislative
authority granted to the Utah Supreme Court in U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). This matter
was taken by the Utah Supreme Court for consideration by Writ of Certiorari, granted on
October 1, 2009.l

In Granting the Writ of Certiorari, the Supreme Court narrowed the

issue, and ordered, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, that the
Writ of Certiorari be granted only as to the following issue:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AS
ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

"Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's
construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Property Rights
Ombudsman Act."2

1

This appeal arises from a consolidated case that involves a road that crosses

through both Box Elder and Cache Counties. Box Elder is the only Appellee in this case
because the Selmans" - the Appellants, prior application for permission to appeal the trial
court's decision regarding Cache County was dismissed on procedural grounds. See,
Appellate Case No. 20070682-CA. Therefore, Cache County is not a party to this appeal.
2

See, Order Granting Certiorari issued by the Utah Supreme Court, on October 1,

2009, Case No. 20090479-SC.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the decision issued by the Court of Appeals in Selmcrn v. Box Elder County, 208
P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009). the Court of Appeals held that "[b]ecause we conclude that
the outcome of this case depends on statutory interpretation, we review the district
court's decision for correctness" Id. at 537 (emphasis added). Where the grant of the
Writ of Certiorari did not request this issue be briefed, Appellees conclude that this is the
proper standard of review.

KEY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. CASE LAW,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
1.
2.

Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009) (See Addendum
"A")
Utah Code Ann. §13-43-101 et. seq. (See Appellants' Brief Addendum "C")

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Appellants (the "Selmans" or "Appellants") brought separate suits against
Appellee ("Box Elder County," "County" or "Appellee") and Cache Counties
challenging resolutions (hereinafter "Resolutions") the counties passed reiterating the
public nature of a road (hereinafter "Road") that runs roughly east-west between Mantua
City in Box Elder County through to Paradise City in Cache County.
On April 30, 2007. the Selmans filed their first complaint in Box Elder County,

2

requesting, inter alia, injunctive relief. On May 1 1, 2007, Judge Ben Hadfield of the
First Judicial District Court in Box Elder County granted partial injunctive relief,
allowing the defendants to gate the Road; the injunction also prohibited Box Elder
County from doing any construction on the road. Contrary to the Selmans' request, the
district court ordered the Selmans not to lock the gate; however, the court did allow the
plaintiffs to place a sign on the gate indicating that the issue of the Road's ownership was
currently being litigated in the district court. See Addendum B.
On May 23, 2007, the Selmans filed a second complaint against Box Elder County
asking the court to find that the Resolutions constituted an "inverse condemnation" of
their property. Before Box Elder County could answer this complaint, on June 7, 2007,
the Selmans then filed a request for arbitration of the takings/eminent domain issues with
the Property Rights Ombudsman (hereinafter "Ombudsman") to have the takings/eminent
domain issues asserted by the Selmans in their inverse condemnation claims before Judge
Ben Hadfield, arbitrated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13- 43-101 et. seq. See
Addendum C. After the Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, Box Elder
County filed an answer and counterclaim to the Selmans' amended complaint asserting a
counterclaim to quiet title in the property. To Box Elder's knowledge the quiet title
action was never made known to the Ombudsman.
The Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the district court in Cache County by
filing another complaint on June 25, 2007, again asserting, inter alia, an inverse

condemnation claim. Cache County then answered this complaint with a counterclaim
asking Judge Low to quiet title in the road. In their complaints and amended complaints,
the Selmans requested a jury trial. The Selmans had invoked the jurisdiction of two
district courts as well as the Ombudsman at the same time.
The Course of the Proceedings
While the injunctive relief requested by Selmans was granted in part, the district
courts have never ruled on whether or not the Resolutions passed by the counties
constitute inverse condemnation. Further, the issue regarding who owns the Road has yet
to be resolved because jurisdiction over the case has been before appellate courts. Before
the appeals, however, important decisions were rendered by the district court judges.
On August 7, 2007, Judge Gordon Low granted Cache County's motion to
bifurcate the Selmans' amended complaint alleging inverse condemnation and Cache
County's counterclaim requesting the court to quiet title, concluding u[a]fter review of
the memoranda and affidavits filed in this case, the Court is satisfied that judicial
economy would be achieved should a bifurcation occur, and that [Cache County's]
counterclaim should be first litigated as it may be dispositive of a number of other claims
made by the Plaintiffs which would be better addressed separately." See Addendum C.
Judge Low also found that he had jurisdiction to stay the proceedings before the
Ombudsman pending a resolution of the quiet title action. Id.
The Selmans then petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for permission to appeal
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Judge Gordon Low's decision to stay the arbitration; however, they failed to timely file
their appeal, and their request was denied.
The Disposition Below
Eventually, the counties filed motions to consolidate the two cases, and to
bifurcate, inter alia, the Selmans' inverse condemnation claim and the counties' quiet
title actions in the consolidated cases. Judge Ben Hadfield granted the counties' motions,
consolidating the two cases and bifurcating the inverse condemnation claim and the quiet
title actions, finding, in relevant part:
[T]he threshold issue as to ownership of the disputed road
should be resolved first, as bifurcation is likely to further
convenience . . . an efficient resolution to this matter.
Furthermore the Court finds that bifurcation should be
granted because regardless of who actually owns the property,
an initial determination of ownership would likely lead the
parties to negotiate a settlement of remaining claims. Finally,
with respect to the Property Rights Ombudsman Act, it
appears the Court has the authority to issue a stay. Therefore,
the Court will order a stay, but reserves for future
adjudication the question of whether the Property Rights
Ombudsman Act applies to the instant matter. This issue may
be raised after the threshold issue of ownership is determined.
See Memorandum Decision of Judge Ben Hadfield, Addenda E, pg. 4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL
1.

Throughout all proceedings and appeals, the Selmans have acknowledged

that the property in question is in an "Agricultural Protection Area." Utah Code Ann.

5

17-41-401 et. seq.; See Brief of Appellant at pages 4, 5 and 8.
2.

The complaint filed before the district court in both counties alleges a

violation of the Agricultural Protection Act. Utah Code Ann. 17-41-405. See Brief of
Appellant at pages 4 - 5.
3.

Survey maps dating as early as 1878 show that the Road crossed federal

land and connected the towns (now cities) of Mantua and Paradise. It was one of the
primary access points to Cache County from the south. See Addendum F.
4.

Based upon survey maps and other maps that predate any ownership of the

property surrounding the Road by the Selmans, Box Elder County and Cache County
passed resolutions finding the Road to be a public Road. However, nothing in either
resolution indicates any intent to take the Road by Eminent Domain.
5.

Neither Box Elder County, nor Cache County have ever held hearings to

condemn the Road pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-405, which is the basis for the
Selmaifs claim in their complaints before the district court that both counties have
violated the Utah Agricultural Protection Act, specifically that portion of the Agricultural
Protection Act in Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-405. See Brief of Appellant at pages 4 -5.
6.

On April 30, 2007, the Selmans filed their first complaint in Box Elder

County before Judge Ben Hadfield, invoking the jurisdiction of the district court
disputing the findings in the Resolutions. (District Court Case No. 070100436)
7.

On N4ay 11, 2007 Judge Hadfield granted, in part, the Selmans^ request for
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injunctive relief; however, because of the historical use of the Road and pending
litigation regarding ownership of the Road. Judge Hadfield did not allow the Selmans to
lock a gate that closed the road. (See Addendum B)
8.

On May 23, 2007 the Selmans filed a second complaint asking the district

court to find that the Resolutions - despite the injunctions, constituted "inverse
condemnation." The Selmans also complained that the counties had violated the
Agricultural Protection Act. (District Court Case No. 070100436)
9.

On June 7, 2007, the Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

(See Addendum C)
10.

On June 25, 2007, the Selmans invoked the jurisdiction of the District

Court in Cache County by filing, inter alia, an inverse condemnation claim and a
violation of the Agricultural Protection Act. (District Court Case No. 070101434).
However, on December 20, 2007, Judge Hadfield consolidated the two district court
cases, bifurcated the Selmans' inverse condemnation claim and the counties Quiet Title
Action. The Selmans appealed. (See Addendum E)
11.

On April 16, 2009. the Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision styled

Selmcin, Inc. \\ Box Elder County. 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009). In its decision, the
Utah Court of Appeals found:
Some issues peripherally related to a takings claim are not
appropriate for arbitration by the Ombudsman; the ownership
of the property in dispute is one such issue. Further, the
district court clearly retains jurisdiction over any matters not
7

before the Ombudsman. Indeed, "[t]he trial court has original
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-5-102(a) (2008).
See Selmcin v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 ^j 11. Based upon this finding the Utah
Court of Appeals held that the district court retained jurisdiction over the issue of
property ownership because of the Quiet Title Action:
We conclude that the ownership of the property in dispute
is a threshold issue to the subsequent question of whether
there has been a taking. The facts of this case illustrate why
such threshold questions are appropriately resolved judicially
before arbitration.
In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three
causes of action: claims for trespass and inverse
condemnation and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder
County did not assert a takings or eminent domain action and
defended its position with a claim to quiet title. Thus, the
claims in this case are currently amorphous. So long as the
very ownership of the Property is in dispute, the remaining
claims are undefined.
Id. at 5371H| 9 - 10.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Utah Court of Appeals properly interpreted the Property Rights Ombudsman Act
by reviewing the plain language of the Act. Because the plain language of the Act
provides that only "private property owners" can invoke the provisions of the Act, the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the issue of ownership of the property does not fall
under the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman but must first be determined by the
district court.
8

Consequently, in order for the Ombudsman's office to assert jurisdiction over this
matter, it would have to inappropriately assume that the Selmans own the Road and that a
taking has occurred. Such an assumption is an entirely inappropriate function of the
Ombudsman and would result in an improper expansion of the scope of the Act. As a
result, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the District Court's
construction of the scope of the Act.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT'S
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
ACT.
In Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009), the Court of
Appeals examined the following provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act:
The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of
the Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 1343-101 to -206 (supp. 208. Among other things, the
Ombudsman is authorized to mediate or arbitrate disputes
between property owners and government entities:
If requested by the private property owner and
otherwise appropriate, the . . . Ombudsman shall
mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration for, disputes
between private property owners and government
entities that involve:
(a) takings or eminent domain issues;
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 78B, Chapter 6.
Part 5, Eminent Domain: or
(c) disputes about relocation assistance under
Title 57. chapter 12, Utah Relocation Assistance Act.
Id § 13-43-204(a).
9

See Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 % 7. The Utah Court of Appeals
properly established the general rule before interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204(a),
to wit: "'In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. We do
so by First evaluating the best evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language
of the statute itself. We give the words of the statute their plain, natural, ordinary, and
commonly understood meaning.' Wasatch County v. OkeIberry\ 2008 UT 10, ^ 13, 179
P.3d 768 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully consider the
statutory language at issue.'" Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 ^ 6. The
Court of Appeals then outlined the Appellant/Selmans' argument regarding the
interpretation of the statute:
In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial
resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim.
Plaintiffs [Selmans] argue that quiet title actions fall under the
umbrella of "takings or eminent domain issues" articulated by
subsection (a), and thus should be included in, not litigated
prior to. the arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this
interpretation reads the phrase "takings or eminent domain
issues" too broadly.
Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 537 ^| 8. The Court of Appeals then analyzed
the common meanings of the words "taking" and "eminent domain" and thereafter.
concluded:
We conclude that the ownership of the property in dispute is
a threshold issue to the subsequent question of whether there
has been a taking. The facts of this case illustrate why such
threshold questions are appropriately resolved judicially
10

before arbitration.

Selmcm v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d at 538 <| 9.
In their brief to the Utah Supreme Court, the Selmans first point out the "shall"
language in Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 (a), to wit: w1f requested by the private property
owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall
mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The Selmans
ignore the fact that a "private property owner'' is the only entity that has standing to
invoke the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; rather, the Selmans move directly to a circular
analysis of the word "shall" so they can assert that since they requested the Ombudsman
to mediate in this case, the district court must relinquish its jurisdiction to the Quiet Title
Action to the Ombudsman so that the Ombudsman can decide if the Selmans are actually
private property owners before determining the damage award the Selmans are entitled to
because of an alleged taking. See Appellant's Brief, pages 14-16.
A.
By expanding the scope of the Act at the Selmans' request, the
Ombudsman was forced to assume that the Selmans own the Road, contrary to Box
Elder County's claim that the county owns the Road; otherwise the Ombudsman
could not take jurisdiction of this case from the district court.
In their brief, the Selmans assert they do not have to establish, a priori, they
actually own the property in question. They brush aside the fact that a Quiet Title Action
is pending before the district court to determine if the Selmans are private property
owners of the disputed land, and assert that the Ombudsman can assert jurisdiction over

11

the action and determine the issue of property ownership after the Ombudsman takes
jurisdiction over the case. See Appellant's Brief, page 16. As they argued before the
Court of Appeals, the Appellant's Brief asserts, "ownership of property is at the heart of
all takings disputes. Ownership is the first of several mandatory elements in any takings
claim." Id. (Citations omitted). Box Elder County does not dispute this. The real issue,
however, is whether ownership issues should be settled before the Ombudsman asserts
jurisdiction and removes a Quiet Title Action from the jurisdiction of the district court.
The purpose of the Act, as evinced by the language of the Act and a common
sense reading of the Acf is to give the Ombudsman an opportunity to arbitrate an award
between a property owner whose property is being taken by eminent domain by a
government entity. The language of the Act makes this clear: For example. Utah Code
Ann. § 13-43-204(d) provides. u[i]n arbitrating a dispute, the arbitrator shall apply the
relevant statutes, case law, regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in
conducting the arbitration and in determining the award." Id. (emphasis added). The
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 continue by providing, "Within 30 days after
an arbitrator issues a final award, and except as provided in Subsection (3)(e), any party
may submit the award, or any issue upon which the award is based, to the district court
for de novo review" Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 (i) (emphasis added). It is clear that

Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 179 P.3d 768, 774 ^J 13 (Utah 2008)
12

the jurisdictional authority of the Ombudsman - and the purpose for arbitration under the
Act, is to help arbitrate a monetary damage award between a private property owner and
the government to compensate the property owner for property taken by eminent domain.
Nothing in the Act indicates it was created to remove Quiet Title Actions from courts.
1.

By attempting to broaden the scope of the Act, and in order to wrest
jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman must abandon a
position of neutrality and must assume the Selmans own the Road.

Again, the first paragraph of Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 states in relevant part,
fcv

If requested by a property owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the Property

Rights Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration ....'" Id. (emphasis
added). All of the citizens of Box Elder County, not just the Selmans own the portion of
the Road that the Selmans claim as their own. Survey maps and other documents show
that the Road connects Mantua City in Box Elder and Paradise City in Cache County, and
has done so since 1877. See Addendum F. The Road was established as a public road by
use long before the Selmans purchased a portion of the property surrounding the Road in
1952. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(1); see also^ Ch. 142 § 1116, Laws of Utah, 1911.
Now. persons using the Road must travel a number of miles to find that the portion of the
Road that crosses the Selmans' property is closed; then they must turn around and
proceed back down the Road. Of course the Selmans dispute that the Road was created
by use prior to 1877 or that it was one of the primary roads connecting Cache County to
other cities in the south. This is, in fact, the very focus of the Quiet Title Action before
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the district court. See (District Court Case No. 070100436). But either way, it is
improper for the Ombudsman to take sides to establish jurisdiction.

2.

By attempting to broaden the scope of the Act, and in order to wrest
jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman has assumed that
the Selmans own the Road creating an appearance of impropriety.

Again, nothing in the Act indicates it was created to remove jurisdiction of a Quiet
Title Action from the district courts and bestow jurisdiction in the action to the
Ombudsman. As admitted, Box Elder County agrees with the Selmans that "private
property ownership is the first of several mandatory elements in any takings claim." See
Appellant's Brief at page 17. Again, the question should be whether the Ombudsman
can assume the Selmans are private property owners in this case to take jurisdiction from
the district court and thereafter decide the ownership issue without at least some
modicum of undisputed evidence that the Selmans actually own a portion of the Road.
Instead of requiring some undisputed evidence that the Selmans own a portion of
the Road, the Ombudsman wants to take jurisdiction of this case based upon an
assumption the Selmans own the road. Again, only a "property owner" can request the
assistance of the Ombudsman to determine an award for damages under Utah Code Ann.
§ 13-43-204. By broadening the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204, the
Ombudsman's assumption - despite Box Elder's contrary claim, that the Selmans own a
portion of the Road creates an appearance of bias and impropriety. Box Elder County
suggests it defies common sense and the intent of both Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-201 et.
14

seq. and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-101 et. seq. to conclude that the Utah Legislature
wanted mediation or arbitration conducted by an Ombudsman's office that is not neutral
3.

The Court of Appeals was correct when it refused to broaden the scope
of the Act to the extent that the Ombudsman's jurisdiction would be
based upon assumptions that favor one party over another.

In its decision, the Utah Court of Appeals - while not specifically addressing the
issues discussed herein, nonetheless touched upon them:
In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial
resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim.
Plaintiffs argue that quiet title actions fall under the umbrella
of "takings or eminent domain issues" articulated by
subsection (a), and thus should be included in, not litigated
prior to, the arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this
interpretation reads the phrase "takings or eminent domain
issues" too broadly.
A "taking" is "[t]he government's actual or effective
acquisition of private property either by ousting the owner
and claiming title or by destroying the property or severely
impairing its utility/' Black's Law Dictionary 1467 (7lh ed.
1999). Relatedly, "eminent domain" is u[t]he inherent power
of a governmental entity to take privately owned property,
especially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to
reasonable compensation for the taking." Id. At 541. Both of
these terms begin with the premise that a private property
owner actually owns the property at issue: title to the property
is not in dispute.
Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 at 537-538 ffi| 8-9. The Court of Appeals
analysis here is correct. Ownership of the Road is the centerpiece of Box Elder's lawsuit
against the Selmans. Box Elder strongly contends it owns all of the Road, including the
portion that crosses the Selman's property, and that the Road has been a public Road
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since the late 1800fs. The Court of Appeals was correct when it refused to broaden the
scope of the Act to the extent that it would allow the Ombudsman to assume otherwise.

B.
By expanding the scope of the Act at the Selmans' request the
Ombudsman was forced to assume that there is a takings in this case, contrar) to
Box Elder County's claim that there is no taking.
Nothing in any record - no findings of fact or conclusions of law, support the
Ombudsman's conclusion that this case involves a takings issue. The Selmans have
referred to the Resolutions; however, the Resolutions are not part of any record and it is
impossible for the Ombudsman to assume that these Resolutions indicate that Box Elder
County inversely condemned the property 4 Further, the district court has enjoined the
county from exercising any control over the Road, thereby making inverse condemnation
impossible. Further, the Court of Appeals further found:
In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three
causes of action* claims for trespass and inverse
condemnation and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder
County did not assert a takings or eminent domain action
and defended its position with a claim to quiet title Thus,
the claims in this case are currently amorphous. So long as

4

Again, Box Elder County is troubled by the assumptions that the Ombudsman is
making in order to wrest jurisdiction of this case from the district court, and the lack of
neutrality it demonstrates. At the present time, the district court has enjoined Box Elder
County from improving the Road The Selmans still have their gate across the road. It is
inappropriate for the Ombudsman to assume "imerse condemnation "' particular^ where
the Selmans still control the portion of the Road that crosses their property Further, the
issue of "m\erse condemnation" is an issue of contention, and it shows bias on the part of
the Ombudsman to attempt to take jurisdiction away from the district court based upon an
assumption of "inverse condemnation."
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the very ownership of the Property is in dispute, the
remaining claims are undefined.
Selman v Box Elder Conn ft, 208 P 3d at 537 % 10. (Emphasis added)

1.

By attempting to broaden the scope of the Act, and in order to wrest
jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman must assume
there has or will be a "taking" in the foreseeable future b) Box Elder
County, even though Box Elder County has no intention of
condemning the property.

While the Court of Appeals lefused to assume that Box Elder County intends to
condemn the Road if Box Eldei County loses the Quiet Title Action, the Selmans are
pushing this assumption, and the Ombudsman seems willing to side with the Selmans to
acquiie jurisdiction This forces Box Elder County to place facts in Box Eldei County's
Appellate Brief that are not a part of any record to rebut what the Selmans and the
Ombudsman want the Supreme Court to assume Not now, noi in the foreseeable future,
M /// Box Eldei Conn ft commence condemnation proceedings to acquire the Road if Box
Elder County does not vi in the Quiet Title Action Gi\ en the state of the econonn and the
limited resources mailable to Box Elder Counft, the counft cannot afford to take the
Road through eminent domain and improve it
In their Appeal Bnef, the Selmans assert that ww[a]n overly-narrow mterpietation of
the Ombudsman's Act unfanly denies the Selmans their statutoiy right to arbitration/'
See Appellants Brief at page 19 (Emphasis removed)

In reality, an oveily-broad

interpretation of the Act allows the Ombudsman to assume a taking has occurred or will
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occur, despite a dearth of evidence to support this claim, and once again, this creates an
appearance of bias and impropriety by the Ombudsman's Office.
2.

As a matter of law, there is no taking at the present time under the
Agricultural Protection Act, and therefore, the Ombudsman must
assume Box Elder County has violated the Agricultural Protection Act.

The Appellants readily admit that the property in question is in an "Agricultural
Protection Area." See, Utah Code Ann. 17-41-401 et. seq.: Brief of Appellant at pages 4,
5 and 8. Box Elder County agrees. Accordingly, Box Elder County must take specific
steps to condemn the Road if it is not a road established by use as Box Elder contends:
A political subdivision having or exercising eminent
domain powers may not condemn for any purpose any land
within an agriculture protection area that is being used for
agricultural production . . . unless it has obtained approval,
according to the procedures and requirements of this section,
from the applicable legislative body and the advisory board.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-405. Box Elder County has not sought approval from its
Commissioners to condemn the Road; nor has it sought approval from its advisory board
to condemn the Road. Box Elder County's position is that the Road is established by use,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(1) and its predecessor statutes that have been in
existence for at least a century, see, e.g., Ch. 142 § 1116, Laws of Utah, 191.
As a matter of law, the county cannot condemn the Road because the county has
not gained permission to do so as required by the Utah Agriculture Protection Act.
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specifically, Utah Code Ann.§ 17-41 -405.5 Therefore, the Ombudsman must assume the
county has violated the Agricultural Protection Act. Again, this is improper.
3.

Where Box Elder County does not intend to condemn the Road, any
monetary award based upon the Ombudsman's contrary assumptions
will be useless in effecting any meaningful resolution to this case.

Box Elder County rightly objects to the Ombudsman's lack of neutrality in this
case: To take jurisdiction from the district court, the Ombudsman must read the Act so
broadh that the Act allows the Ombudsman to: (a) assume that portion of the Road that
crosses the Selmans' property is not a public road; (b) assume that Box Elder County has
"inversely condemned" the property; and/or ( c) assume that Box Elder County intends to
condemn the portion of the Road that crosses the Selmans' property if the county loses
the Quiet Title Action.
Box Elder County objects to Ombudsman taking jurisdiction in this case because
of bias, and also because the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that once the
Quiet Title Action is resolved all other issues will either evaporate or become clearer.
See Selman v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535, 538 at ^| 10. With respect to the "inverse
condemnation" claim, if the county loses the quiet title action, the claim evaporates,
because the county will not take the property at issue and any damage to the property

Here, the Selmans make the circular argument that the county is condemning the
Road, but has violated the Utah Agricultural Protection Act.
19

from the county's commencement to improve the Road will be damages for trespass, not
condemnation. The county will not condemn the Road; therefore, it is odd that the
Selmans want the Ombudsman to determine damages for a taking, when there will be no
taking - either now or in the foreseeable future. An assessment of an "award" under
Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204 is a useless and unnecessarily expensive endeavor.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals as well as the ruling of the district court.
DATED this

^ k y day of December, 2009.

BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY

MfL. ft tuj/JJ
Stephen R. Hadfield
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I hereby certify that on this ^.UVday of December, 2008, two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE BOX ELDER COUNTY were sent via
postage prepaid, first class U.S. mail to:

Shaun L. Peck
Brandon J. Baxter
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.
399 North Main, Suite 300
P.O. Box 675
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Attorneys for
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants and Appellants

BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY

Steph&P Hadfield

f
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
Hi
Plaintiffs Fred, Laura, and Bret Selman are principals of
Harold Selman, Inc. (collectively the Selmans), which engages in
a variety of farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits
on property the Selmans own, situated on the border between Box
Elder and Cache Counties (the Property). Box Elder County
attempted to build a road on a livestock trail that crossed the
property. The Selmans sued and subsequently filed a request for
arbitration of their dispute with the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman (the Ombudsman). Box Elder County filed a
counterclaim in district court to quiet title in the property,
The district court bifurcated the claims and stayed the
arbitration pending resolution of the quiet title action. The
question before us is whether the stay of arbitration is
permissible under the Ombudsman's enabling statutes (the
Ombudsman Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp.
2008). We affirm.

BACKGROUND
^2
Situated partly in Box Elder County and partly in Cache
County, the Property is designated by both counties as an
Agriculture Protection Area, see Utah Code Ann. § 17-41-101(3)
(Supp. 2008), and is subject to a conservation easement. A
livestock trail, on which animals are herded to the upper grazing
meadows, traverses the Property.
1J3
In 2007, both counties passed resolutions claiming part of
the Property as a county road. Later that year, Box Elder County
initiated road construction on a remote road located on the
Property, including the removal of a gate owned by the Selmans
that blocked the livestock trail. The Selmans filed suit,
praying for injunctive relief and asserting claims for trespass
and inverse condemnation. The district court entered a Temporary
Restraining Order halting the road construction and ordering
reinstallation of the gate. That Temporary Restraining Order is
still in effect. Three weeks later, the Selmans filed a second
suit against Box Elder County asserting additional causes of
action. The Selmans also filed suit against Cache County to
prevent it from beginning similar road construction.1
H4
Before Box Elder County filed its answer, the Selmans filed
a request for arbitration of their dispute with the Ombudsman,
see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-204, which the Ombudsman accepted.
Box Elder County then answered the Selmans' complaint and
asserted a counterclaim to quiet title and for injunctive relief.
Box Elder County also filed a motion in district court to stay
arbitration before the Ombudsman, to bifurcate the Selmans'
claims from Box Elder County's quiet title claim, and to stay all

1. Plaintiffs filed suit against Box Elder and Cache County
separately. Both counties filed counterclaims. On August 7,
2007, Judge Low granted Cache County's motion to bifurcate the
proceedings, allowing the quiet title action to move forward to
litigation and staying the arbitration of the remaining claims.
Judge Low further noted that "it does not appear to be the kind
of claim which the . . . Ombudsm[a]n was created to address in
the first place." The Selmans filed a petition for interlocutory
appeal with this court that was dismissed for failure to timely
file a valid notice of appeal. On October 16, 2007, Judge
Hadfield ordered that Box Elder County's and Cache County's cases
be consolidated because they "involve common questions of law and
fact." On January 14, 2008, Judge Hadfield ordered that the two
counties' counterclaims to quiet title be tried together and
bifurcated from the other issues. Judge Hadfield further ordered
that discovery, deadlines, mediation, and arbitration would all
be stayed until after the counties' quiet title counterclaims
were resolved.
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discovery and deadlines on the Selmans' claims until the quiet
title claim is decided. The district court granted Box Elder
County's motion, bifurcating the case and staying arbitration.
The Selmans appeal that decision pursuant to the Utah Uniform
Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (2008)
(allowing parties to appeal "an order granting a motion to stay
arbitration").
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
%5
We are asked to consider whether the district court erred in
bifurcating the claims and staying arbitration of the dispute.
This is an issue of first impression. Because we conclude that
the outcome of this case depends on statutory interpretation, we
review the district court's decision for correctness. See
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic
Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, fl 13, 200 P.3d 643.
ANALYSIS
%6
"In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the
Legislature's intent. We do so by first evaluating the best
evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language of the
statute itself. We give the words of a statute their plain,
natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning." Wasatch
County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 13, 179 P.3d 768 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully
consider the statutory language at issue.
^[7
The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-101 to -206
(Supp. 2008). Among other things, the Ombudsman is authorized to
mediate or arbitrate disputes between property owners and
government entities:
If requested by the private property owner
and otherwise appropriate, the . . .
Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or
arrange arbitration for, disputes between
private property owners and government
entities that involve:
(a) takings or eminent domain issues;
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title
78B, Chapter 6, Part 5, Eminent Domain; or
(c) disputes about relocation assistance
under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation
Assistance Act.
Id. § 13-43-204(1).
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1f8
In this case, arbitration has been stayed pending judicial
resolution of Box Elder County's quiet title counterclaim.
Plaintiffs argue that quiet title actions fall under the umbrella
of "takings or eminent domain issues" articulated by subsection
(a), and thus should be included in, not litigated prior to, th^
arbitration. We disagree, concluding that this interpretation
reads the phrase "takings or eminent domain issues" too broadly.
^9
A "taking" is "[t]he government's actual or effective
acquisition of private property either by ousting the owner and
claiming title or by destroying the property or severely
impairing its utility." Black's Law Dictionary 1467 (7th ed.
1999). Relatedly, "eminent domain" is "[t]he inherent power of a
governmental entity to take privately owned property,
especially] land, and convert it to public use, subject to
reasonable compensation for the taking." Id. at 541. Both of
these terms begin with the premise that a private property owner
actually owns the property at issue; title to the property is not
in dispute. The principle of inverse condemnation, which is not
specifically included in the Ombudsman Act but was one of the
claims originally asserted by the Selmans, also shares that
underlying premise: "An action brought by a property owner for
compensation from a governmental entity that has taken the
owner's property without bringing formal condemnation
proceedings." Id. at 287. Even the constitutional provisions
governing all similar claims begin with the premise that
ownership of the property is not in dispute. See U.S. Const,
amend. V ("[Pjrivate property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation."); Utah Const, art. I, § 22
("Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation."). Furthermore, "[a] claimant must
possess some protect [a]ble interest in property before that
interest is entitled to recover under [the takings provision of
the Utah Constitution]." Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d
622, 625 (Utah 1990). This principle is applicable to inverse
condemnations as well as direct takings. See Stevens v. LaVerkin
City, 2008 UT App 129, ^ 21, 183 P.3d 1059. We conclude that the
ownership of the property in dispute is a threshold issue to the
subsequent question of whether there has been a taking. The
facts of this case illustrate why such threshold questions are
appropriately resolved judicially before arbitration.
flO In their original complaint, the Selmans asserted three
causes of action: claims for trespass and inverse condemnation
and a petition for injunctive relief. Box Elder County did not
assert a takings or eminent domain action and defended its
position with a claim to quiet title. Thus, the claims in this
case are currently amorphous. So long as the very ownership of
the Property is in dispute, the remaining claims are undefined.
Once the quiet title action is decided, however, the remaining
issues are much clearer--either the Property belongs to the
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Selmans and the action is one for inverse condemnation, trespass,
or both, or it does not and the entire dispute most likely
evaporates.2
til Accordingly, we conclude that some issues peripherally
related to a takings claim are not appropriate for arbitration by
the Ombudsman; the ownership of the property in dispute is one
such issue. Further, the district court clearly retains
jurisdiction over any matters not before the Ombudsman. Indeed,
n
[t]he trial court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil
and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not
prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(l) (2008).
CONCLUSION
Kl2 The quiet title action in this case does not fall under the
statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman; that is, it is not a
takings or eminent domain issue. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's ruling bifurcating the claims and staying
arbitration pending the outcome of the quiet title claim.

VZ+rut'tk*'

/•

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

H13

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

6 Trie
CarolynvB. McHugh, Judge'

2. We note thai: if the action is for trespass, it does not fall
within the scope of the Ombudsman Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 1343-201 (1) (Supp. 2008) .
20080229-CA
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Shaun L Peck (#7595)
Brandon J. Baxter (#9122)
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
74 West 100 North
P.O. Box 675
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435)787-9700
Facsimile: (435)787-2455
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Civil No: 070100436
Judge:
Ben Hadfield

Defendant.
This matter came before the Court this 11 day of May 2007 upon Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint, Plaintiffs' Motion, and
the exhibits attached to the motion, including the Affidavit of Brett Selman dated May 8, 2007 the
Supplemental Affidavit of Brett Selman dated May 10, 2007, and the Affidavit of Fred Selman,
dated May 11, 2007. Defendant has been provided the Complaint, Plaintiffs' Motion and copies
of the Affidavits. Based upon the Complaint, the Motion and the exhibits attached thereto, the
Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

Temporary Restraining Order

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs have filed a civil complaint against Box Elder County alleging, among

other things, Violation of Agriculture Protection Area, Violation of National Environmental
Policy Act and applicable regulations, and Violation of Conservation Easement.
2.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, on May 9, 2007 which the

Court has considered as a motion for temporary restraining order under URCP 65A.
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating that they own property

situated in Box Elder County upon which the Defendant has engaged and/or is engaging in road
construction and related operations.
4.

The Plaintiffs' Motion sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating a substantial

likelihood that the Plaintiffs may suffer irreparable harm to their private property interests unless
the order or injunction issues. The damage that may be caused is irreparable because no
monetary damage award would compensate Plaintiffs for the damage caused.
5.

The Plaintiffs' Motion sets forth sufficient facts demonstrating a substantial

likelihood that the threatened injury to the Plaintiffs outweighs whatever damage the proposed
order or injunction may cause the Defendant.
6.

The Court finds that the order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the

public interest.
7.

The Court finds that this case presents serious issues on the merits which should

be the subject of further litigation.
8.

Based upon the Affidavit of Fred Selman, the Court finds that the requirement of

security may properly be waived in this instance.

Temporary Restraining Order
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
9.

Plaintiffs have met the requirements for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order under URCP 65 A.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT:
1.

A temporary restraining order shall issue as follows:

2.

Plaintiffs shall reinstall a gate at the cattle guard located on Section 31 of the

Selman Property. The gate may be closed, but shall not be locked.
3.

The following notice shall be posted on the gate:
NOTICE
The use of this road is subject to litigation currently pending in
First District Court for Box Elder County, Case No.: 0 7010043 6
Individuals found on private property may be
subject to criminal prosecution,
This sign is posted pursuant to the
Court's Order in the above referenced case.

4.

Defendant shall not undertake any further construction, maintenance or related

activities on the road where it traverses the Plaintiffs' property pending further hearing of the
Court.
5.

The Court hereby waives the filing of a bond, undertaking or other security.

6.

This Order shall continue in effect until further hearing on this matter. That

hearing is set for June 13, 2007, at 9:00 am, the earliest date available with sufficient time for the
Court to adequately hear the parties on this matter.

Temporary Restraining Order
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DATED this J±_ day of May 2007 _JL" _^2 a«/pm.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING
IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY
OF THE ORIGINAL FILED IN FIRST
DISTRICT COL " -,3X ELDER.

Temporary Restraining Order
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Beamson & Peck, L.C.
Attorneys At Law
With Attorneys Licensed to Practice Law in
Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Oregon, Virginia and Florida

74 West 100 North
P.O. Box 675
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 787-9700
Telefax: (435) 787-2455

Brad H Bearnson, P.C
Shaun L Peck, P.C.
Marty E. Moore, P.C.
Bretton K. Hadfield, P.C.
Brandon J. Baxter
Daniel K. Watkins
Wayne K.Caldwell
Shawn P. Bailey
Keely Schneiter *

bbaxter@bplaw.biz

* Registered Patent Attorney

June 7, 2007
Brent Bateman, Private Property Ombudsman
Elliot Lawrence, Private Property Ombudsman
Utah Department of Commerce
P.O. Box 145610
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5610
Re:

Selmans, Box Elder County, Cache County Private Property Takings Matter

Dear Brent and Elliot:
This letter constitutes our clients' request that the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman conduct a mediation regarding certain private property takings issues.
As you are aware, our office represents Fred and Laura Selman, Bret and Michelle
Selman, and Harold Selman, Inc. ("the Selmans") regarding several private real property takings
issues involving Box Elder County and Cache County. As we have discussed, the particular
takings issue involves resolutions passed by the Counties in April and May which make claim on
private roads that pass through the Selmans5 real property in the mountains on the Box Elder
County-Cache County border.
I appreciate the time that you have taken to speak to us and the various county officials
regarding this issue over the past few weeks. At this time the Selmans formally request that your
office conduct a mediation regarding the takings issues pursuant UCA § 13-42-204, The parties
to the mediation should include the Selmans, Box Elder County, and Cache County.
It is my understanding that upon a request by a private property owner it is mandatory for
your office conduct such a mediation. UCA § 13-42-204(1). It is my further understanding that
it is mandatory for the counties to participate in such mediation arranged for by your office as if it

Brent Bateman, Private Property Ombudsman
Elliot Lawrence, Private Property Ombudsman
June 7, 2007
Page 2 of 2
were ordered by the Court. UCA § 13-42-204(2). If you believe my interpretation of the
mandatory nature of this mediation is in error, please contact me immediately. Furthermore, if
your office intends to decline this request for mediation on statutory or other grounds, also
contact me immediately.
As further background regarding the nature of the dispute, I have attached here for your
reference, pleadings filed by the Selmans in First District Court against Box Elder County and
Cache County. I have also attached a copy of an administrative appeal that has beenfiledin
Cache County.
I would ask that you contact Cache County and Box Elder County at your earliest
convenience to inform them of our mediation request. After you have made contact with these
government entities, I look forward to setting a day for our mediation.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have questions or would like to discuss this
matter further.
Yours truly,
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.

Brandon J, Baxter

BJB/ah
Enclosures
cc: Fred & Laura Selman (w/out enclosures)
Bret & Michelle Selman (w/out enclosures)

ADDENDUM "D

Iii the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of Utah
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, arid BRET SELMAN,
Plaiutiff(s),
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Number: 070101434 MI
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW

CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant(s).

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate
and Stay filed on July 17, 2007. The County requests to bifurcate the proceedings, litigate the issue with
respect to the County's claim to quiet title, and stay any flirther proceedings relative to further claims made
by the Plaintiffs. After review of the memoranda and affidavits filed in this case, the Court is satisfied that
judicial economy would be achieved should a bifurcation occur, and that the County's counterclaim should
be first litigated as it may be dispositive of a number of other claims made by the Plaintiffs which would
be better addressed separately. Additionally, it does not appear to be the kind of claim which the State
Office of Properly Rights Ombudsmen was created to address in the first place. The Court does have
jurisdiction to control this litigation despite the reference to the State Office of Pioperty Rights and
therefore, this Memorandum Decision will serve as notice that the proposed Order Bifurcating and Staying
Claims filed with the motion has been adopted by this Court and signed and entered this 7th day of August,
2007.

ADDUNDUM UE"

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD SELMAR INC. a Utah
Corporation: FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,

MEMORAND1IM DECISION

Plaintiffs and Counterclaim i
Defendants,
vs.

Case No. 070100436

BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Judge: Ben H. Iladfield

Defendant and
Counterclaimant,

HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants,
vs.
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant and
Counterclaimant.

1

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant and counterclaimant
Box Elder County's (hereinafter the "County") Motion to Bifurcate and Stay, In preparation of its
decision, the Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support. Plaintiffs'
Response in Opposition, Defendant's Reply in Further Support, Plaintiffs" Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support, each
1
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document submitted before the Court, and the applicable ease law and statutory provisions. ALo,
a hearing was held in this matter on December 13, 2007. Furthermore, on August 7. 2007, Judge
Gordon J. Low rendered a Memorandum Decision in a substantially similar proceeding in Cache
County (Case No. 070101434) granting Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay. The
Cache County and Box Elder County matters have now been consolidated into the present case.
Under Rule 42(b), a court may uin furtherance of convenience oi to avoid prejudicef,]
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third party claim, or any separate
issue or of any number of claims,... counterclaims ... or issues." The Utah Supreme Court has
held that "trial courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding bifurcation and consolidation
requests under rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." See, e g.t Coleman v. DiUman% 624
P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1981) (bifurcation under rule 42 may be accomplished for the com enience
and at the discretion of the trial court); Raggenbtick v Suhrmann, 325 P.2cl 258, 259 (Utah 1958)
(absent prejudice to a litigant, the trial court has discretion to consolidate matters for trial).
In seeking bifurcation and a stay, the County argues that their counterclaim to quiet title
should be tried prior to litigation and/or arbitration on Plaintiffs' claims. The County argues that
there is a threshold question as to ownership of the disputed road which should be resolved first
in order to further convenience, avoid prejudice and the expense of litigating unnecessary claims,
and efficiently resolve the instant matter. Plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants (hereinafter the
"Selmans") challenge the County's road resolution on various grounds and contend it constitutes
a taking, thus (arguably) requiring the County's participation in arbitration arranged by the Office
of the Property Rights Ombudsman, in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204(2).
However, the County argues that bifurcation should nonetheless be granted because if the road
belongs to the County, then the Sclmans' claims fail; conversely, the County concedes that if the
Selmans' arc determined to be the rightful owners, then a taking cannot occur without payment
of just compensation. Finally, the County argues that the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman's requirement that the County submit to arbitration should be stayed by thus Couit
until a determination has been made on the threshold issue of ownership. According!}, the
County seeks the Court to find that the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low is the "law
of the case"5 and that it should control the Court's decision as to Box Eldei County.
2

In response, Plaintiffs argue that bifurcation and staying the arbitration is contrary to
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43, and fails to make the matter more convenient or efficient
Plaintiffs argue that given the statutory mandate, regarding arbitration, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 1343-204(2), the court should deny the requested stay, Plaintiffs claim that the Court should give
deference to the Legislature and the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in allowing the
matter to be first heard in arbitration. In response, the County argues that the statute does not
prohibit judicial authority to stay such proceedings, noting that the arbitration provided for under
the Act is subject to de novo review, UTAH CODE ANN, § 13-43-204(3)(l). See aha UTAH CODF
ANN. § 78-3-4 ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all maters civil and criminal, and
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Accordingly, the County
seeks a stay of arbitration until after determination of ownership.
Plaintiffs also assert that bifurcation would be unfair and prejudicial to the Selmans and
that the issues are not clearly separable, as argued by Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue
that arbitration, not bifurcation of complicated matters, is the most cost-efficient manner by
which the parties could resolve the matter. Plaintiffs also cite to the holding of Walker Drug Co ,
Inc. v La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) and assert, similarly, that bifurcation in the
instant matter would be unfair. However, the County properly distinguishes Walker Drug
wherein the issue of damages was tried prior to a determination of liability (known as ''reverse
bifurcation^). In the instant matter, the Court finds that an action to quiet title would be an
appropriate issue for bifurcation (clearly not ''reverse bifurcation") and within the Court's
discretion to so order.
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
i%

any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the

claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties [emphasis added]/' Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the Memorandum Decision
rendeied by Judge Low, as it adjudicates fewer than all the claims of the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parlies, can be revised by the Court under Rule 54fb) and notwithstanding the
"'law of the case" doctrine cited by Defendant.

J

After reviewing the pleadings and the parties' arguments presented at the December 13,
2007 hearing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs" analysis that pursuant to Rule 54(b). the Court has
the authority to revise the Memorandum Decision rendered by Judge Low on August 7, 2007;
however, the Court finds no reason to revise the Decision. The rationale set forth in Judge Low's
August 7, 2007 Decision corresponds with this Court's view of the bifurcation issue. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the Memorandum Decision entered by Judge Low on August 7, 2007, will not
be revised and will govern this consolidated matter. Case No. 070100436, and apply to Box Elder
County,
The Court also finds that the threshold issue as to ownership of the disputed road should
be resolved first, as bifurcation is likely to further convenience and an efficient resolution to this
matter. Furthermore, the Court finds that bifurcation should be granted because regardless of who
actually owns the property, an initial determination of ownership would likely lead the parties to
negotiate a settlement of remaining claims. Finally, with respect to the Property Rights
Ombudsman Act, it appears that the Court has the authority to issue a stay. Theiefore, the Court
will order a stay, but reserves for future adjudication the question of whether the Property Rights
Ombudsman Act applies to the instant matter. This issue may be raised after the threshold issue of
ownership is determined.
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low on August 7, 2007,
and as supported by the facts and governing law, Defendant and counterclaimant Box lilder
County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay is granted. Also, implicit in this Memorandum Decision,
the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider August 7, 2007 Order to Bifurcate and Stay.
Counsel for Defendant is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith
Dated this 3 P da> of December, 2007
BY THE COURT:

KZ- A. / f j y

BcnH Hadficid
/'
DISTRICT COUR F JIJDGE
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and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision in the case of Selman
vs. B.E. County and Cache County case number 070100436, as follows'

Barton II. Kunz II
Attorney At Law
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